The United States must be able to deter computer attacks against our critical information infrastructure. A strong deterrence policy involves both a strong defense and the threat of retaliation or punishment. Despite a strong defense to deny cyber attackers access to our systems, we remain vulnerable because it is nearly impossible to stop all intrusions. Therefore, we must be able to punish or retaliate against individuals, sub-state groups or states that are responsible for cyber attacks. This ability to retaliate involves more than just an offensive information warfare capability. In most cases, the DOD must use US law enforcement to assist in identifying and locating the perpetrator. In the realm of cyber defense, law enforcement now plays a critical role in national security and national defense.
Our reliance on computers and information-based technologies within DOD has greatly increased the vulnerability of our military forces if our information systems are attacked. DOD systems now receive numerous intrusion attempts daily and this trend appears to be increasing. In 1994 the total of network attacks reported throughout DOD was only 225. By 1999, the total number of reported events was just over 22,000, and if the trend continues, there will be over 24,000 by year‘s end.1 This increased threat of network attack has highlighted a new US vulnerability and increased the importance of defensive information warfare for the US military.
There is much written on the subject of information warfare and how this new type of warfare will affect and shape the future of war. The discussion of information warfare always deals with both offensive and defensive information operations and discusses our ability to defend and deter against information warfare attack. It is logical to categorize defending against cyber warfare in traditional military terms when military terms are used to explain and define this concept called information warfare. Unfortunately, this broad generalization of information warfare and defense against information attack neglects one fundamental difference between traditional warfare and information warfare. The difference is that an attack against our information infrastructures located in the United States is actually a crime and must be countered within the legal requirements and jurisdictions of US code.
The very nature of defending our critical national infrastructure from an information warfare attack cannot be viewed in a traditional military sense and must be thought of and countered differently than traditional warfare. A strong defense against information warfare attack can be effective either by denial or a threat of punishment. Denial against information attack rests on very strong defenses so that an aggressor cannot achieve his objective and requires effective identification and authentication mechanisms. The threat of punishment or governmental reprisal against an attacker requires identifiable targets that can be located and attacked and relies on auditing and trace-back methods.
The US military has focused a large proportion of its efforts on denying and preventing cyber attacks and rightly so. It is paramount that we do everything within our power to deny the adversary access or the ability to attack our systems. Unfortunately, we can never be 100 percent certain that our systems are invulnerable to attack. Cyber attackers can always find trapdoors and glitches in software that allow them to get around obstacles; or, if that fails, they can try launching very sophisticated password cracking programs. This vulnerability was highlighted after a 1998 investigation at a Department of Energy Laboratory, where a hack had shut down the facility for a few weeks. After this event, systems security administrators were running a password-cracking program to help assess and limit the risk of future intrusion. But, even after a year, their program was still able to guess one in ten new passwords every week.3 Based on this inherent fallibility with information systems, especially as network linkage increases, we can never totally rely on a strategy of denial. Therefore, it is important to also address deterrence and the ability to counter cyber attack by threat of punishment or military reprisal.
The important issue in countering a cyber-attack through threat of reprisal is to discern the type of attack, identify the adversary and respond appropriately. Given the current US national information infrastructure (NII) and the US military‘s reliance on the NII, most cases of identifying the perpetrator of an information warfare attack or any attack against DOD systems will be the responsibility of US law enforcement. In most cases, the traditional war fighting military is prohibited from executing this mission domestically because of US laws.
This spectrum of cyber-conflict will show the correlation between computer attacks and criminal activity and highlight why the US military cannot counter or respond to information attacks until after the perpetrator is identified. DOD must develop a robust law enforcement function to assist in a strategy of countering cyber attacks. Without law enforcement‘s assistance, appropriate US government reprisals such as criminal punishment or US national policy responses in the form of diplomatic or economic sanctions or military reprisals will not be possible. Finally, without this credible response capability, the US will lack the vital ability to deter future network attacks.
Our reliance on computers and information-based technologies within DOD has greatly increased the vulnerability of our military forces if our information systems are attacked. DOD systems now receive numerous intrusion attempts daily and this trend appears to be increasing. In 1994 the total of network attacks reported throughout DOD was only 225. By 1999, the total number of reported events was just over 22,000, and if the trend continues, there will be over 24,000 by year‘s end.1 This increased threat of network attack has highlighted a new US vulnerability and increased the importance of defensive information warfare for the US military.
There is much written on the subject of information warfare and how this new type of warfare will affect and shape the future of war. The discussion of information warfare always deals with both offensive and defensive information operations and discusses our ability to defend and deter against information warfare attack. It is logical to categorize defending against cyber warfare in traditional military terms when military terms are used to explain and define this concept called information warfare. Unfortunately, this broad generalization of information warfare and defense against information attack neglects one fundamental difference between traditional warfare and information warfare. The difference is that an attack against our information infrastructures located in the United States is actually a crime and must be countered within the legal requirements and jurisdictions of US code.
The very nature of defending our critical national infrastructure from an information warfare attack cannot be viewed in a traditional military sense and must be thought of and countered differently than traditional warfare. A strong defense against information warfare attack can be effective either by denial or a threat of punishment. Denial against information attack rests on very strong defenses so that an aggressor cannot achieve his objective and requires effective identification and authentication mechanisms. The threat of punishment or governmental reprisal against an attacker requires identifiable targets that can be located and attacked and relies on auditing and trace-back methods.
The US military has focused a large proportion of its efforts on denying and preventing cyber attacks and rightly so. It is paramount that we do everything within our power to deny the adversary access or the ability to attack our systems. Unfortunately, we can never be 100 percent certain that our systems are invulnerable to attack. Cyber attackers can always find trapdoors and glitches in software that allow them to get around obstacles; or, if that fails, they can try launching very sophisticated password cracking programs. This vulnerability was highlighted after a 1998 investigation at a Department of Energy Laboratory, where a hack had shut down the facility for a few weeks. After this event, systems security administrators were running a password-cracking program to help assess and limit the risk of future intrusion. But, even after a year, their program was still able to guess one in ten new passwords every week.3 Based on this inherent fallibility with information systems, especially as network linkage increases, we can never totally rely on a strategy of denial. Therefore, it is important to also address deterrence and the ability to counter cyber attack by threat of punishment or military reprisal.
The important issue in countering a cyber-attack through threat of reprisal is to discern the type of attack, identify the adversary and respond appropriately. Given the current US national information infrastructure (NII) and the US military‘s reliance on the NII, most cases of identifying the perpetrator of an information warfare attack or any attack against DOD systems will be the responsibility of US law enforcement. In most cases, the traditional war fighting military is prohibited from executing this mission domestically because of US laws.
This spectrum of cyber-conflict will show the correlation between computer attacks and criminal activity and highlight why the US military cannot counter or respond to information attacks until after the perpetrator is identified. DOD must develop a robust law enforcement function to assist in a strategy of countering cyber attacks. Without law enforcement‘s assistance, appropriate US government reprisals such as criminal punishment or US national policy responses in the form of diplomatic or economic sanctions or military reprisals will not be possible. Finally, without this credible response capability, the US will lack the vital ability to deter future network attacks.
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